The Repatriation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Indonesia: Its Dilemma and Debates

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Abstrak: ISIS (Negara Islam di Irak dan Suriah) telah memperluas gerakannya ke Asia Tenggara, termasuk Indonesia yang pernah diserang teroris karena negara itu menjadi tempat pilihan teroris untuk bepergian dan menjalankan rencana mereka di zona konflik. Untuk mengatasi masalah ini, pemerintah Indonesia telah mengeluarkan kebijakan untuk menghindari implikasi negatif atas pemulangan WNI terkait terorisme dari luar negeri (Foreign Terrorist Fighters atau FTF). Pemerintah telah mempertimbangkan apakah FTF akan dipulangkan atau tidak karena rencana ini sempat menjadi perdebatan di Indonesia. Pemerintah prihatin dengan kemungkinan mereka merekrut anggota baru. Di sisi lain, kemanusiaan menjadi alasan sebaliknya yang menyebabkan diterimanya kebijakan repatriasi ekstremis. Karena urgensi dari ancaman teroris yang merajalela dan konsekuensinya, pemerintah Indonesia telah memutuskan untuk menerapkan kebijakan repatriasi. Pemerintah akhirnya menolak pemulangan warga negara Indonesia yang terkait dengan terorisme di luar negeri untuk melindungi keamanan nasional. Artikel ini mengelaborasi mekanisme radikalisasi, proses rekrutmen teroris berdasarkan teori keamanan nasional. Studi ini juga menjelaskan situasi dan kondisi mendesak yang membuat pemerintah menerapkan penolakan repatriasi. Masih ada banyak tantangan terkait kebijakan repatriasi yang perlu ditangani seperti infrastruktur yang relevan dan peraturan yang efektif.

Kata kunci: Repatriasi; Terorisme; Teroris Internasional; ISIS; Indonesia

Abstract: ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) has expanded its movement to Southeast Asia, including Indonesia which once got attacked by terrorist as the country becomes terrorists' preferred place to travel and execute their plans in conflict zones. To tackle this problem, Indonesian government had issued a policy to avoid negative implications upon the return of Indonesian nationals linked to terrorism from abroad (Foreign Terrorist Fighters or FTF). The government was considering whether or not to repatriate FTF since this plan remains a debatable issue in Indonesia. The government was concerned with the possibility of them recruiting new members. On the other side, humanity becomes the opposite reason leading to the acceptance of the extremist repatriation policy. Due to the urgency of the rampant terrorist threats and the consequences, the Indonesian government has decided to implement the repatriation policy. The government ended up refusing the repatriation of Indonesian nationals linked to terrorism abroad to protect the national security. This article elaborates the radicalization mechanism, terrorist recruitment process based on the national security theory. This study also explains the urgent situation and condition that made the government apply refusal against repatriation. There are still

considerable challenges regarding the repatriation policy that need to be addressed such as relevant infrastructure and effective regulations.

Keywords: Repatriation; Terrorism; International Terrorist; ISIS; Indonesia

Introduction

Currently, terrorist groups in Indonesia seem to apply new pattern of recruitment and attacks. One of the terrorist groups in Indonesia that has huge power of influence is ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). This organization was formed by those who separated from Al-Qaeda since 2014 (Sky History TV Channel, 2021). However, ISIS applies different strategies from Al-Qaeda in establishing Islamic State. Abu Bakar Al- Baghdadi as the leader of ISIS contradicted the Al-Qaeda's pattern and decided to apply new strategies. Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi objected to Zawahiri's insistence as the leader of Al-Qaeda who commanded ISIS to focus only in Iraq and leave Syria out (BBC News, 2015). Baghdadi and his supporters are explicitly against Zawahiri as the leader of Al- Qaeda and finally declared himself as a Caliph and ISIS as the Caliphate (Islamic Networks Group, 2021).

ISIS expands their territory and spreads their influence even to other countries. Their pattern of recruitment is more open than Al-Qaeda. They spread the influence through doctrine and propaganda about radical ideology. They make use of social media to spread their propaganda. There is no exception such as gender, age or even profession for anyone to access for their propaganda. As the results, they manage to recruit member in huge numbers including from the countries outside Iraq and Syria (Arifin, 2017). Recently, ISIS movement intensified in Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia (Hikam & Munabari, 2022; Rijal, 2017). Indonesian citizens especially Muslims are the target of recruitment through indoctrination and propaganda using citation from the holy book principles (Barton, 2018). They spread radical ideology and tell elaborate Syria as a very peaceful nation and ensure the targets that they will gain happiness performing "jihad" in the form of suicide bombing. Such propaganda make some Indonesian Muslims overwhelmed in extremist ideology as they wanted to conduct "*hijrah*" which means moving from one place to another place, which in this context is moving out to Syria. However, after they arrived in Syria, they found out about the real situation which was completely different from what had been told, and they regretted their decision and wished to come back to Indonesia.

On the other side, Indonesia reinforces a program called deradicalization aimed at countering back terrorism to maintain the stability and the security of the state (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019; Widya, 2020). The program has been implemented following several terrorist attacks happened in several places in

Indonesia. However, Indonesia has been trying to strengthen its counter-terrorism program especially when the form and the target of a terrorist attack has changed. The terrorist attacks that occurred between 2011 – 2020 targeted the police. Therefore, the idea of accepting back more than 689 Indonesians ex-ISIS to Indonesia becomes a dilemma (Soeriaatmadja, 2020b).

Indonesia has been facing a national security issue coming from domestic and transnational terrorism. The terrorism issue does not only impact the government but also the society. From 2011 – 2020, a lot of people in different regions in Indonesia became the victims of terrorism including killings and destructions of their properties. The recent horrendous terrorist attack happened in public places such as the house of worship like churches, restaurants such as Starbucks in Central Jakarta, and even directed towards police headquarter. The terror intensifies as terrorists are no longer scared of the police. There have been many terrorist attacks that put Indonesian police as the main target, even they attacked the headquarters of the police's elite forces (Hikam, 2018). The terror disrupts the public security.

The stability of Indonesia as a nation has been threatened (Prasetyo, 2016, p. 36). Various efforts have been implemented by the government in cooperation with several institutions such as Badan National Penanggulangan Terrorism (National Counter Terrorism Agency, refers to BNPT) to counterterrorism and to radicalize the extreme ideology. The terror in society even remains because the attacks keep occurring despite the arrest of the terrorist and the implementation of the deradicalization program. Coercive approach seems no longer effective. Hence, the current deradicalization program uses the combination between coercive and non-coercive approaches by collaborating with Indonesian stakeholders (Prasetyo, 2016, p. 39).

The ex-ISIS repatriation program potentially increases of national security threat which should be carefully considered (Madrim & Hussein, 2020). The government has to choose between the national security and humanity. It is uncertain whether the 689 ex-ISIS Indonesians have repented and willing to be deradicalized (Andry, 2020). A tight filtering should be conducted against these 689 ex-ISIS members. This article attempts to answer the question of why Indonesian ex-terrorists' repatriation program becomes a dilemma? The article employs the perspective of national security and the concepts of radicalization and terrorist recruitment. It argues that there are still considerable challenges regarding the repatriation policy that need to be addressed such as relevant infrastructure and effective regulations.

Methods

This uses a qualitative method. Deep comprehension on the pattern of issues through existing non-numerical data is the result of this study. Primary and secondary data used in this study obtained from different sources such as research articles, online newspapers, books, and documents relevant to the research topic. Employing the perspective of national security and the concepts of radicalization and terrorist recruitment, this research elaborates on the gaps between the deradicalization approaches and the extremist conditions to highlight the challenges in the deradicalization program, especially regarding the extremists' conditions such as background, mindset, reasons of joining extremist groups and performing terrorism.

Discussions

The Stakeholders' Responses of Extremists Repatriation Program

The Indonesian Government's Program of Extremists Repatriation

Several countries also face similar situation regarding repatriation of ex-extremists to their home countries as the repatriation program applies to almost all countries after the arrest of ISIS sympathizers by Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) at the refugee camp in the North Syria. However, some countries accept the repatriation of their citizens, but some other countries object the repatriation such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, Kosovo, and Turkey. There are also countries that only accept the kids in small quantities for example France, United State, Germany, Australia, Sweden, and Norway (BBC News Indonesia, 2019). Nonetheless, the discussion of this program remains unfinished since the repatriation program does not show the effectiveness of taking back the sympathizers as the counter-terrorism effort (Levenia & Sciascia, 2020). There have been pros and cons regarding the extremists' repatriation (Madrim & Hussein, 2020). The complexity of Indonesia's counterterrorism has received concerns from experts, politicians, religious leaders, academics, researchers, and others, especially when it comes to the issue of extremist repatriation.

It begins with more than 600 Indonesian citizens moved to Syria, aiming to become the Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) and now willing to be back to Indonesia. Indonesian extremists who initiate to become FTF exists in Syria, Turkey, and other borders, were mostly because they got caught or deported by the legal authorities of the countries that they transit (Soeriaatmadja, 2020a). There is no legal access to ISIS camp, yet Indonesian extremists somehow managed to get there. They mostly travelled from Indonesia to Kuala Lumpur Malaysia first, then they took flight to Istanbul, Turkey. In Turkey, they usually met the representative of ISIS in Hatay (the Southern province in Turkey and the border to Syria territory), and crossed the border to ISIS camp in Syria

(Taufiqurrohman, 2015).

Table 1. *Indonesian citizens affiliated in Syrian and Iraq conflict*

No.	Indonesian citizens affiliated with FTF in Syria and Iraq	Men	Women	Total
1.	Still in Syrian and Iraq	451	188	639
2.	Died in Syria and Iraq	107	4	111
3.	Back to Indonesia as returnee	76	21	97
4.	Get deported to Indonesia	315	238	555
5.	Plan to go to Syria and Iraq	116	62	178
	Total	**1,067**	**513**	**1,580**

Source: (The Habibie Center, 2019)

ISIS propaganda does not target specific gender, The data show that ISIS attracts men and women as sympathizers and fight for ISIS' victory. There are large number of women, men and children being trapped in Syria and Iraq, mostly in the Al-Hawl refugee camp that is located 300 kilometers north of Baghouz. The remaining hundreds of women and children stay in other refugee camps. Improper camp condition makes it miserable places to live (The Habibie Center, 2019). Al-Hawl has received attention as it is the most crowded refugee camp. Facilities in the camp, including the place to sleep and tent capacity could not accommodate all of them, while other refugees keep coming. They sleep on mats, and improper sanitation also makes it difficult for them to get clean water and adequate bathroom facilities. Even worse, the food supply does not come regularly (The Habibie Center, 2019).

The refugees' health, especially children are not well-managed due to the unavailability of medical facility and medicines. Most of children got diarrhea and were malnourished. Such condition even worsens in the winter. Furthermore, in Al-Hawl camp also does not provide psychology rehabilitation facility for the children, while they keep witnessing violence in war and they are exposed to radical ideology. This condition can appear as traumatic experience or make them motivated to also believe in radicalism (The Habibie Center, 2019). Thus, many of them want to go back to their home countries including Indonesia. However, some of them want to be back to Indonesia because they are being arrested in a transit country and fail to enter Syria and

some of them can no longer stand watching brutality that they see and feel in ISIS camp. Several of them also feel disappointed with the life under ISIS authority that is completely different from their expectations. Therefore, the decision to refusing or accepting the militant becomes a big decision to protect Indonesia (Neumann, 2016, pp. 1–16)

Notwithstanding the extremist reasons to come back to Indonesia, the Indonesian government and citizens should also consider the sympathizers' reason to leave for Syria by their own will. Meanwhile, a lot of stakeholders tend to refuse the repatriation seeing that most extremists decided to become part of ISIS to establish Caliphate.

A Repatriation Refusal Perspective

There are varieties of responses regarding repatriation plan. However, Mr. Joko Widodo, the President of Indonesia shared his own perspective, where he prefer making thorough consideration regarding the advantages and disadvantages of repatriating Indonesian former ISIS (Windaarty, 2020). A politician namely Mahfud MD personally declined the repatriation for it might bring new problems for Indonesia as radical ideology is like a virus (Hastanto, 2020). He firmly stated that Indonesians who went to Syria clearly intended to become terrorists and support ISIS. Mahfud MD also emphasized that there will be a possibility that those who get repatriated and finished undergoing a deradicalization program will relapse after they are into society.

Moreover, an intelligence and terrorism expert, Stanislaus Riyanta also added that repatriation of Indonesian former ISIS will hurt Indonesian society who are victimized in terrorist attacks (Taher, 2020). He argued that it is strange when people fight for the humanity for 689 ISIS combatants after the terrorist attacks that have claimed death, lifelong disability, traumatic, etc. He is strongly against the repatriation for the sake of national security.Another disagreement also came from a former leader of Jamaah Islamiyah, Nasir Abbas. Even he was the leader of the terrorist group, he refused the repatriation of ex Indonesian extremists in Syria. He told to the BBC Indonesia the following statements:

"We know that they are dangerous either they are Indonesian citizens or foreigners. If we are not aware of facing this 'virus', it will become so dangerous. Do not take it easy" (Hastanto, 2020).

He realized that radical ideology is too dangerous. It spreads quickly and it is not easy to cleanse radical ideology from formers/terrorist inmates. Nassir has witnessed the challenges of deradicalization as he knew that a lot of former extremists remained

radical after they were set free from prison and passed the deradicalization program. Furthermore, Said Aqil Siradj as the chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama emphasized the need to refuse the repatriation. He made it clear that those who went to Syria consciously left the country and burned their passport. Indonesia should not be too forgiving to those betrayers (Prabowo, 2015).

A Repatriation Acceptance Perspective

However, several people agree to the repatriation in order to protect national security, Chairul Anam as the human rights commissioner, insists the government repatriate those Indonesian citizens former ISIS (Taher, 2020). He argued that the government does not have legal reason to refuse the repatriation of its citizens. He believed that Indonesian citizens can accept ex-ISIS based on their respective roles in ISIS campaign. The founder of the Institute for International Peace Building, Noor Huda sees this problem as a chance for the government to gain valid news regarding terrorist organization (Hastanto, 2020). Deeper understanding of the terrorist group's information either their plan or acts can be used in countering back terrorism.

Not only about the information advantage, Noor also argued that repatriation can be applied for children repatriation (Hastanto, 2020). He also believes that not all women are victims, but he considers the children who are brought by their parents might be impacted if they are separated from their parents. Abdul Muti as the general secretary of Muhammadiyah agrees to the repatriation of Indonesian who went to Syria because as he concerns the human rights and political rights. He supports the repatriation and argues that the problem of devotion lack toward Pancasila can be solved by rehabilitation and political development rather than refusing them from coming back to Indonesia (Permana, 2020).

The Gaps of Deradicalization Programs in Indonesia

Extremists' repatriation remains a polemic and dilemma whether or not to accept it. The current deradicalization program is the most predominant measurement for the extremist repatriation final decision. There are still a lot of gaps exist in deradicalization program. If the gaps are not resolved, repatriation is not a good choice as it makes deradicalization more difficult and threatens the national security.

Therefore, as Williams (2012) explains about the security, it is a sort of Indonesia's intentions to have a freedom from terrorism threat. Instead of letting the potential problem of terrorism increase, thus the state choose to refuse repatriation as a form of prevention. It shows the effort to maintain the stability. Similarly, Larosa (2019) national policy should be made based on the considerations of all aspects.

Thus, it is important to measure the gaps of Indonesia deradicalization itself including the systems, the subject involved, the flow, the communication, and the extremist situation. This formal system needs to be examined, evaluated and improved in countering terrorism. Indonesia is one of the countries that already has more comprehensive approach in deradicalization program compared to other countries (Usman, 2014, p. 12). However, the different perspective between extremist and Indonesia as nation state becomes the gap that should be solved.

The Gaps in Different Perspectives between Extremists and Indonesia as a Nation State

According to Zuhri, the deradicalization program nowadays only concerns the wrong ideology. Therefore, the BNPT only focus in contra- ideologization. BNPT also highlights the benefit of entrepreneurship. Whereas nowadays, terrorist radical circle see the society and state as people with bad, discriminative, corrupt and non-islamic characteristics (Zuhri, 2018, p. 121). Even, in accordance to the terrorist inmate Ahmad Hassans, in 2014, when the peak of agreement in terrorist recruitment to devote their dedication to the group, some of them who refuse to join the terrorist group is claimed as "Murtad" / (out of Islam) and is permitted to be killed (Nurdin, 2020).

Countering the terrorism requires the solving of the root problems. In this case, the root problem is that terrorists perceive other people and the nation as sinful persons. Those who have weak mind can easily get brain washed easily which later makes the radicalism grow even stronger. The misconception of Islamic value on seeing other people, an unpleasant incident, disappointment and other factors can also influence this matter. The dexterity is needed in the deradicalization effort because it will lead to two different endings. If it is done well, it can lead to the end which means that the deradicalization is successful. On the other hand, it will lead to the dangerous situation if it is not well-resolved.

The Gaps in Deradicalization System between Stakeholders

In addition to different perspectives between extremist and all elements of Indonesia as nation, the deradicalization program system and implementation also need to be evaluated. The evaluation should include several aspects including the implementation flow, the synergy coordination between all stakeholders involved, human resource qualification as the implementors, and other aspects. For the primary aspect, the deradicalization program remains an assertive implementation. Even today, it is still lacking a comprehensive legal framework. The deradicalization program still leaves confusions regarding the priority (Widya, 2020, p. 39). It is surely a complex program however the priority setting that have been clear bring the program implementation

will not be overlapped and unstructured.

It needs more clear and certain guidance model of deradicalization for all the parties involved, including the government or the stakeholders through TOR (Term of References) (Bahtiar & Sumari, 2017). TOR provides clear job description and suitable job composition. It also can prevent the misunderstanding of the execution and the implementation of certain concept. There are a lot of workers in the prisons who are not given clear method and implementation. Unfortunately, the unclear coordination still occurs. BNPT is the institution that holds the responsibility for designing and preparing the program in collaboration with the corrective institution, specifically Cipinang prison. Inadequate communication between these two organizations can also lead to miscoordination between BNPT and Cipinang prison (Bahtiar & Sumari, 2017).

Deradicalization Gaps in Prisons
Some problems also happened in prisons, such as the limited qualified officers in prison. Inadequate knowledge and skill of the prison officers and the task division create other problems (Bahtiar & Sumari, 2017). Even worse, prisons in Indonesia are mostly overcapacity (Larasati et al., 2022). No specific training or guidance have been given to prison officers on how to approach, talk and influence the inmates. While the number of prison officers is limited, the number of officers with good competence in performing deradicalization is even fewer. The job description of the officer is often unclear that some officers have been overwhelmed by their task (Bahtiar & Sumari, 2017).

The unsystematic program in prisons makes officers perform double functions as consultants for the inmates due to unavailability of special counseling program for terrorist inmates. Prison officers often hold overlapping tasks (Bahtiar & Sumari, 2017). Furthermore, the human resources quality, quantity and competency in performing terrorist inmates counseling are also lacking which bring adverse impacts to the profiling and assessment process. Meanwhile, the profiling and assessment are very crucial process for inmates' placement. Many terrorist inmates are placed in the same jail with the other general inmates. The terrorist inmates are not the same as the other inmates, as they do not usually mingle and cooperative. Terrorist inmates often have their very own thoughts which might influence the other inmates or even the workers with radical thoughts. Terrorist inmates should be given specific treatments.

To be able to perform specific jobs such as the treatment, the assessment and profiling for terrorist inmates, prison officers also need to have specific competence. Only few

prison officers have relevant education background in law, religion and psychology. Thus, condition between one prison to other prisons might be different. In addition, related to the handling program. Prisons that do not have competence officers in performing profiling and assessment face more challenges in for having no oversight of the assessment results. Mistake on assessing inmate's psychological condition and their background sometimes occur. It should be also put into consideration that terrorist inmates can influence the other general crime inmates.

Efforts to Fill the Gaps

Deradicalization programs also requires good infrastructure / building, ideal prison, and the quantity of available space for implementing deradicalization program. Efforts to deal with these problems have been conducted, even the terrorist placement should be based on the security level. The terrorist inmate placement is divided into 2; in the special cell or group cell. For the terrorist inmates' placement, the separation is measured by the level of radicalism and level of terrorist inmates' cooperativeness. More radical inmates are less cooperative. The government through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and BNPT has also prepared a specific prison in Sentul for deradicalization program since 2014 that can accommodate 147 inmates with 49 cells that can be occupied by more than 30 people (Directorate General of Corrrections, 2014).

The Regulation of the Director General of Corrections No. PAS-58.OT.01 states that in 2010, every terrorist inmate is categorized as high-risk inmates. Then after the profiling and assessment, they are placed based on the risk level. There are two prisons level two; prisons in Nusakambangan and Gunung Sindur prison (Sindur mount prison) that handle terrorist inmates who have high risk and have the potential to spread the radicalism, arrange, and plan the terrorism act or bother the prison's order and security. Meanwhile cooperative inmates are sent for joining the deradicalization program in class IIB in Sentul prison (Firdaus, 2017, p. 440). The depiction of the terrorist inmate placement based on the risk level and the cooperativeness level is presented in Table 2.

Table 2. *Terrorist Inmates' Placement*

Cooperativeness level	Risk Level	Terrorist Inmates placement		
		Super maximum security prison	General Prison	Sentul Special prison for terrorist Inmates
1	High	✓	✓	
2	High	✓	✓	
3	Middle		✓	✓
4	Low		✓	✓

Source: (Firdaus, 2017)

Although terrorist inmates are separated from other inmates, terrorist inmates can still influence other terrorist inmates even the prison officers due to over capacity that new terrorist inmates might be put in general prison (Larasati et al., 2022). Hence, not all general prison can handle terrorist inmates or administer specific program for terrorist inmates' necessity. Kedung Pane Prison in Semarang has successfully applied more structured flow of the program where regular agenda and regular activities are done regularly (Febriyansah et al., 2017).

Kedung Pane prison has prison counseling division with three sub-division; society counseling, treatment, and registration section that can help prevent excessive tasks for the officers. In the specific sections, every officer will focus on their job description based on their section. For example, the society counseling section officer will focus on the counseling the mental as well as spiritual, law and social problems, intellectual counseling and development for greater enhancement of the state. The counseling program is not a pure intangible development but it is a tangible development such as physical wellness. They will give true examples of riding a boat and art activities. Beside that, they will also responsible about the inmates conditional right such as assimilation, day off to family visit, or conditional exemption (Febriyansah et al., 2017, p. 97) .

In Kedung Pare prison, there is a special division that provides health service for inmates, including medical check-up and other health services. This division holds the responsibility of referring sick inmates to the hospital out of prison and also handles funeral jobs. Those are under treatment section. The division also prepares and provide food, drink, clothes, and equipment of inmates, as well as creating schedules for

workers on duty (Febriyansah et al., 2017). The registration division holds responsibilities regarding the registration; scanning the fingerprint, determining new inmates numbering, storing inmates' belongings, recording the inmates punishment and making suggestion for remission, and handling the administration process for the inmates replacement and the inmates return who finish their sentence (Febriyansah et al., 2017). In short, huge gaps among prisons occur as every prison has different situation and problem that require solutions adjusted to their respective conditions. The condition in Kedung pane prison can be used as a reference to improve the deradicalization programs in all prisons.

Furthermore, the government also strives to cope with terrorists' different perspectives (Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law, and Defense, 2020). The government tried to facilitate appointment between the perpetrators and the victims' family. In 2018, the government attempted to invite more than 120 ex terrorist inmates to meet about 50 victims of terrorism attack. They spent 3 days for face-to-face discussion and dialogue. According to Irfan Idris, this agenda increases the awareness of the ex-terrorist inmates about the impact of terrorist act towards the victims. It is expected that the former terrorist inmates will be willing to influence their extremist network members to leave radicalism. Apology from terrorism victims is believed to open inmates' mind that violence will only leave the victims hurt (Affan, 2018). It is still a long journey to close the gaps among prisons, but these efforts need to be appreciated.

Conclusions

The repatriation can be a dangerous program owing to what extent the deradicalization process success handling the radicalization deployment in Indonesia. If Indonesia is still working hard in solving current challenges of deradicalization, the repatriation will only give another burden. Non-optimal deradicalization will be followed by more citizens get radicalized and a greater number of citizens going to the Middle East as foreign terrorist fighters, thus there will be greater number of people asking to get repatriated. In addition, there will be some foreign terrorist fighters who pretend that they have left the radicalism only to come back to Indonesia and perform terrorist attacks which will threat the national security.

The cycle will continue to threaten the national security as there will be more terrorist attacks which can cause greater casualties. Such condition can also disrupt the unity in diversity or Bhinneka Tunggal Ika ideology as radicalism disunites the community and brings intolerance. Even today, radicalization agendas still rife. The deradicalization could not yet catch up the radicalization done by extremists in Indonesia. Therefore, repatriation program is not merely about receiving back Indonesia nationals from Syria

to Indonesia, but it is also about hidden agenda and other factors that drive these citizens to go to Syria. In addition, the gaps in and challenges in the current deradicalization program needs to be first resolved.

It is strongly important to calculate the risks and potentials of repatriation. There are a lot of considerations that are interrelated. Different prison condition in Indonesia should also be considered in implementing the deradicalization program, especially the systematic and the communications between the stakeholders involved. In addition, rejection from the community against anti-radicalism campaign still becomes a huge challenge for deradicalization program. It is easier today for the community to get exposed to radicalism and get recruited as members of terrorist group. This exposure should be reduced in more effective ways because it is the starting point of individuals deciding to go Syria to support ISIS.

In short, thorough observation and comprehension on how individuals can become radical makes the deradicalization program more effective. In this situation, the government needs to cooperate with all stakeholders and broader community to support the eradication of radicalism.

Considering the facts that there are still many Indonesian people driven to become foreign terrorist fighters, repatriation program needs to be re-considered. It should be made certain the advantages and disadvantages of receiving foreign terrorist fighters back from Syria to Indonesia, and whether or not they make deradicalization program fail. Even in the end, the government officially refuses the repatriation, the deradicalization program still needs further development and thorough evaluation to make it more effective.

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